Sensor network is a notion denoting an interesting subset of self-organising wireless networks. These networks are rather dense as each node have typically more than dozen neighbours, and large -with tens to hundreds thousands of nodes. Applications of such networks assume distributed environmental sensing performed by each sensor in the network, where data from a particular sensor gain value only when combined with data from a relatively high number of other sensors. One of the open security questions in this specific environment is a possibility to lower requirements on key distribution and key management and thus decrease production costs. One of the possible ways is "key infection". The paper recaps a protocol and already published results. It also elaborates the concept of key infection by introducing a new variant of security amplification protocol, and presents some interesting results obtained by simulations.
Introduction
Wireless networks are widely used today and they will spread even more with increasing number of personal digital devices people are going to use in near future. Sensor networks form just a small fraction of future applications but they abstract some of the new concepts in distributed computing. Still, the notion of sensor network is used in several different contexts. There are projects targeting development of very small and cheap sensors (e.g. [11] ) as well as research in middleware architectures [14] and routing protocols (AODV [4] , DSR [5] , TORA, . . . ) for self-organising networks -to name a few.
In this paper, we are interested in very simple sensors but we are assuming large number of them in a network. The number is such that it is infeasible to deploy sensors manually. Deployment in batches implies self-organising network that is automatically and autonomously established upon physical deployment of sensors. Large numbers of sensors make it also hard to change code or data stored in particular sensors -it is much easier to mass-produce sensors that are identical even on firmware and data level.
We focus here on key management schemes for sensor networks. Section 2 overviews some of the existing models that are based on key predistribution ensuring that either most sensors will able to talk to each other, or there will always be some of the neighbour nodes sharing a pairwise key. Key infection introduced in section 3, on the other hand, does not presume existence of predistributed keys and all sensors can be thus identical, cheap to produce, and resistant to data-discovery attacks in pre-deployment production phases. Section 4 introduces some interesting results we found while playing with sensor networks behaviour.
Key predistribution schemes
Deployment of a sensor network can be split into several phases. The following list is adjusted to discern important processes of key infection protocols. The main phases are as follows:
(i) physical nodes deployment -random spreading of sensors over a target area in one throw or in several smaller batches,
(ii) neighbours discovery -sensors are trying to find their neighbours and establish communication channels, (iii) initial key setup -initial pairwise keys are established, (iv) key amplification -sensors are improving secrecy of shared keys by using intermediary nodes, (v) establishment of point-to-point keys -the final goal is always to transmit data securely from sensors to one of a few sinks. Point-to-point keys are pairwise keys between sensors and sinks (or distant sensors), (vi) message exchange -the production phase of the network.
We are most interested in phases three and four, while the first two are based on random distribution and the last one is beyond our scope as long as it does not contain further key amplifications (that can be repeatedly applied on the network). Phase five may be subject of a following research.
Random key pre-distribution
Most known key predistribution schemes expect that any two nodes can establish a shared pairwise (link) key when they happen to be physical neighbours within their transmission range. This requirement can be weakened in such a way, that two physical neighbours can establish a link key only with a certain probability which is still sufficient to keep the whole network connected through secure links. Such models introduce a trade-off between the graph connectivity of link keys and the memory required to store keys on nodes. If the network disconnects, it is usually possible to increase radio transmission power to reach nodes bridging separated parts of the network.
Idea of random key pre-distribution for WSN was for the first time introduced in [8] as EG scheme. There is an initialisation phase when a pool S of random keys is generated. m keys is randomly chosen from the pool S (without replacement) for each node. Size of the pool |S| and size of each node key-ring |m| is chosen in such a way that any two nodes share at least one key with a predefined probability p. After the deployment, neighbour nodes perform key setup phase, trying to find shared subset of keys and use them for initial link encryption.
Chan, Parrig, and Song extend, in [3] , EG schema by q-composite random key predistribution, requiring at least q shared keys instead of one (referred as q-EG) for a secure link connection. The number of required shared keys makes it exponentially harder for the attacker to compromise a link key with a given subset of already compromised keys, but it also lowers probability of establishing a link key. If the node key ring size |m| is fixed, the total size of key pool |S| must be reduced to preserve the same key establishment probability. The attacker is also able to obtain larger fraction of S from a node. A formula for optimum tradeoff is also defined.
EG schema is further extended in [13] by using pseudo-random generation of key indexes (seed-based key deployment) rather than completely random one. The advantage is that two neighbors can compute their shared keys only from node IDs without additional communication. The paper also describes co-operative version of seed-based key deployment protocol exploiting sets of common neighbours of two nodes A and B for secrecy amplification. A chooses randomly a set of B-neighbours (mediators C i ) and asks them to compute HM AC(ID A , K C i B ). Results from all mediators are xor-ed together with original key value K AB and used as the new key value. Node B can compute this new key value without further communication from a list of mediators used.
Pairwise key pre-distribution
Pairwise key pre-distribution scheme is a scheme, where given key is shared by exactly two nodes. In a basic pairwise scheme, each node shares a unique key with every other node in network ( (n-1) pairwise scheme). This scheme is perfectly resilient against node capture 3 , but is poorly scalable and has high memory storage requirements.
A modification of basic pairwise scheme (CPS scheme) is proposed in [3] . A probability p of two neighbours to share a key is defined first. Unique pairwise keys for are then generated for subsets |m| of randomly chosen nodes. When compared to EG scheme, node-to-node authentication can be performed. Total number of nodes in the network is limited to n = m/p.
Key pre-distribution scheme (referred as Blom's scheme) that allows any pair of nodes to be able to find pairwise secret key is proposed in [2] . Blom's scheme requires substantially less memory than (n-1) pairwise key scheme, but still allows for computing pairwise key between any two nodes. Blom's scheme is perfectly resilient until λ nodes are compromised (λ-secure property). If only one global key space of Blom's scheme is used, λ must be unwieldy high, as well as the required memory to resist node capture. Scalability of such approach is very poor.
Solution based on multiple key spaces is proposed in [6] (DDHV scheme). Instead of one global key space, large key pool S of key spaces KS i is generated and m randomly chosen key spaces KS i are assigned to each node alike EG scheme. Each separate key space then uses the basic Blom's scheme. This approach can be viewed as a combination of EG key pool scheme and a single space approach -like Blom's one. DDHV scheme gives very good node capture resilience until a threshold value of total number of compromised nodes are reached (yet it is based on EG and CPS schemes).
Hwang and Kim [10] revisit basic random pre-distribution EG scheme, CPS scheme, and DDHV using giant graph component theory by Erdös and Réney to demonstrate that even when node degree is small, most of the network remains connected. If the network connectivity requirements are just for a substantial graph component (e.g. 98% of nodes), we can get substantial improvements of local connectivity or lower memory requirements on nodes.
Previous schemes presume that probability of any two nodes to become physical neighbours is uniform. However, in many practical scenarios, some probabilistic knowledge about node deployment can be available a priori. Details about schemes exploiting knowledge about "deployment" can be found in [12] , [7] , [9] .
As you can see, there is a large number of schemes for sensor networks. The rest of the paper should give an arguments (against predistribution schemes) in favour of dynamic key-establishment protocols.
Key infection
Key infection was introduced by Anderson, Chan, and Perrig in [1] . The most important issue introduced in the paper is a real world attacker model -as this justify our approach we give it a bit more space. The predistribution schemes introduced in previous section assume a global passive adversary able to monitor all the communication in the network. This was, with some of the schemes, combined with a local active adversary able to dissassemble single nodes and extract stored predistributed keys or deploy its own sensors that become active in the network's routing protocol.
Our attacker model foresees applications where it is not necessary to protect confidentiality of all data but majority of data. An example might be a sensor network monitoring a certain area for environmental conditions -temperature, humidity, seismic activity, . . . . If an attacker acquires small part of the data, he is able to create a map that is very sparse and we do not mind when this happens. The real value is in the dense and detailed map we can create by combining data from all the sensors. Another example of networks where our attacker model is justifiable compose networks tracking dynamic data. Thus information obtained from a small subset of sensors gives the attacker only static data (like how many cars go through certain roads but) but she is not able to find out dynamic data (e.g. what are the routes of cars). Let us denote such networks as commodity networks.
Attacker model
As pointed out in [1] , the model with a global passive adversary is the one usually used in crypto research. However, there are two aspects against practicality of this model, especially when sensitive data (pairwise keys) are exchange during an instant. We deduce that the attacker must be able to deploy a number of sensors comparable with the size of the original network to eavesdrop all the communication. And this must happen at the very moment when the original network is being deployed. The attacker cannot use substantially lower number of listening devices due to RF signal transmission properties. Firstly, wireless networks will have usually only limited number of frequency channels that are repeatedly used by the nodes in the network. If there was just one adversary eavesdropping the network, most of the communication would be unreadable because of noise generated by other transmissions on the same frequency. Also, if the networks are to use frequencies above, let us say 25 GHz, the nodes can have optimal antennas. The attacker therefore cannot use devices with much better signal gain and improvements can be obtained only through directional antennas.
Secondly, when we assume sensor networks comprised of hundred thousand nodes, we can easily assume that information from single nodes does not make any sense until combined with data from other sensors. It means that single node data are not sensitive and we can lower security requirements and say that we just have to secure most of the data produced by nodes.
There is another important facet of the problem. If a sensor network consisted of, let us say, 100,000 nodes that have to be easy to produce, there is very high probability that some of the sensors would be broken, or worse, malfunctioning and allowing attacker to cryptanalyse some of the predistributed keys and listen to a certain portion of the traffic in the network. The question that stands out is whether we can weaken the attacker model to the following informal definition.
The hostile surveillance is not ubiquitous during the deployment phase of the network and only fraction of the established link keys can be obtained by the attacker.
The new attacker model we are using further on is thus based on the following assumptions:
(i) the attacker is without access to the deployment site during the network deployment;
(ii) the attacker is able to monitor only a fraction of communication during the deployment;
(iii) there is no active attack during the deployment phase.
As we want to get production costs of sensors as low as possible, it would be quite significant to get rid of key predistribution. In other words we want to design a key establishment protocol without global knowledge -predistributed keys -that would still fulfil security requirements for commodity sensor networks.
The simplest possible way of exchanging keys is to broadcast them in clear to all neighbours. As the network nodes start organising themselves and establishing routing paths, the key material is propagated by neighbours -thus the notion "key infection". The plaintext key exchange is not much useful in common scenarios but when this process starts in hundred thousands instances at a time, it becomes extremely difficult for an attacker to compromise larger fraction of the network due to reasons described above.
Amplification Protocols
The concepts introduced in [1] include whispering and multi-path key establishment. Whispering is used to describe a procedure when transmission range of a node is being increased by small steps until a neighbour node can hear the data transmitted.
In the multi-path key establishment, node A generates q different random values and sends each of them along a different path to node B. The attacker must eavesdrop all the paths to compromise the new key value. Multi-hop key amplification is basically 2-path version of multi-path key establishment.
The original amplification protocol proposed in [1] is using one intermediate node (W 3 ), neighbour of two nodes W 2 and W 1 that is asked to retransmit a new random number updating existing link key k 12 of the nodes W 1 and W 2 . The notation of the following lines reproducing the original protocol consists of N 1 and N 2 -random numbers generated by nodes W 1 and W 2 respectively, pairwise keys k ij , k ij of nodes W i and W j , and a hash function H(.).
When we read this protocol (let us call it push protocol) we thought it would be interesting to see what would happen if we reversed the protocol (made it pull protocol) and W 3 would be the node initiating the amplification. (In fact, this was the initial stimulus for all the work we present here.)
The basic idea is that the area where black nodes must be positioned to successfully compromise a link key is smaller than in the push protocol and we wanted to make it clear also by simulations.
The second reason for us to start analysing the amplification was to get a bit more detailed results than those presented in [1] -so we implemented a simulator allowing us to work with networks of hundred thousands of nodes.
Comparing numbers of used messages
Number of messages for the push and pull protocols as described above is all the same. The probability of a new key k 12 to be established using the mediator W 3 is the same for both schemes -the mediator must be in the transmission range of W 1 as well as W 2 . So far, no difference between the push and the pull scheme in respect to communication efficiency.
But we can improve the pull scheme used in combination with basic whispering (key is generated by only one node of the pair) -a variant giving very competitive results with amplification while keeping number of messages low. Let us assume that black nodes are deployed prior to white nodes, and before the initial key setup (see Section 2) in the white network (this is indeed our case). In this setup, we can eliminate encryption of messages, and thus remove one of the messages, sent by W 3 . W 3 can simply transmit value N 1 in plaintext using minimum energy allowing the signal to reach W 1 , as well as W 2 . That is because N 1 is transmitted with exactly the same signal strength as k 13 or k 23 during the initial key exchange (basic whispering). If the attacker is (and was) able to eavesdrop communication between W 3 and W 1 or W 2 (whichever is further from W 3 ), the new key will be compromised anyway as the attacker already possesses the link key k 13 or k 23 , respectively.
Simulation
Currently, the simulation tool we are using allows simple changes in numbers of white and black nodes, transmission ranges of the nodes as well as the size of the deployment area. Black nodes represent an attacker locally eavesdropping communication in the white network [15] . Let us move to the experiments' setup.
Setup
White and black nodes are randomly distributed over a pre-defined area. Neighbours discovery phase is performed for each white node based on its transmission range. Black nodes are not taking part in routing or key establishment procedures. Black nodes act just as passive communication eavesdroppers -they represent a passive adversary. Transmission and reception ranges are equal and there is no difference between whites and blacks in this sense. Black nodes, however, share immediately all information eavesdropped by any of them.
We assume two transmission modes in the experiments. The first one is defined as a transmission with maximum power -covering all neighbours of a given white node. The second one is based on gradual increase of transmission power -called whispering. It means that the number of neighbours able to here the transmitting node is being increased by one each time the power is boosted.
Results
This section describes several interesting issues we have found in simulation results. Our first goal (the goal initially motivating our work) was to verify results presented in [1] . Unfortunately, our results had the same dynamics but absolute numbers were different and in a quite substantially -50-100%.
We asked authors for their original source files and as they very kindly and quickly sent the files in question to us we could go through the code. We found that their implementation is correct but only very small mesh to position nodes was used and the number of nodes used was also considerably low. When we slightly increased implicit number of nodes, the results varied in tens percents. After identifying the source of deviations, we focused entirely on our tool and started more detailed analysis of results with networks of 10.000 -100.000 nodes.
The first set of graphs ( fig. 1) shows results from a network of 10.000 nodes with 1% of black nodes (i.e., there is 100 black nodes).
The set contains graphs for four different methods. In brief, we are combining basic and mutual whispering with pull and push amplification protocols. When the initial key is generated by just one node of a pair, we call it basic whispering. Mutual whispering is the situation when the initial key is combined from two random numbers sent by both nodes in a pair to each other.
The simulations are performed with increasing density of networks and the resulting graphs depict averaged results from at least five simulation runs. The setup used here represents situations when the adversary is able to spread certain number of sensors into the deployment area. They can combine their knowledge, i.e. their transmission range is much longer than the one of white nodes.
You can find at least three very interesting phenomena in the graphs.
Mutual whispering is better than basic whispering by a constant that is given by area ratio of a circle and of an intersection of two circles distant by their radius -this ration is about 0.4. However, the impact of selected whispering type on the amplification protocols results is much more significant. It can be best seen on the upper graphs where the peak of the number of compromised keys differs four-folds and the overall course of the curves is significantly different.
The worst amplification results are for a relatively low density networks. When the network density is reduced to 2-4 neighbours (this can happen by natural reasons like node failures or malicious attacker behaviour), we can squeeze percentage of compromised keys and increase security of the network by adding new white nodes into the network. This key security improvement is very radical and we are able to get the percentage of compromised keys very close to nought for networks with average number of neighbours over twenty. According to numerical results, we are able to get from 0.68% down to 0.00% when increasing density of the network above 20 neighbours in the case of pull amplification with basic whispering. It is less than five compromised keys in the network of 10.000 nodes.
One cannot improve ratio of secure keys with density when a certain number of black nodes is deployed. This is apparent from the first graph when this threshold is reached. In this case, we can very slightly decrease the fraction of compromised keys by increasing density of the network but the best result we can reach is still above 1.5% in this particular graph. We can easily find configurations when it is useless to deploy new white nodes to improve security properties. Each amplification method has got different equilibrium point (percentage of black nodes) when no improvement can be reached. In fact, when this equilibrium point is surpassed, the results are getting monotonically worse with the density of the network.
Pull protocol works nicely with basic whispering but the results are identical with the push protocol when applied after mutual whispering. You can see that the pull protocol works much better over basic whispering. The threshold is 0.76%, compared to 1.99%. Also, the threshold point is at much lower network density. The peak is reached for the density of about 2 while mutual whispering has got the peak for the average network density of 5 or more. If the power consumption is by far the most important aspect, the combination of pull protocols with basic whispering is the best choice as each new key or its refreshing represents just one message.
The amplification results are naturally getting worse with increasing number of black nodes in the network. The second set of graphs on fig. 2 shows an extreme situation, with respect to our attacker model, when the number of black nodes equals 20% of white nodes deployed.
These graphs are not so optimistic for the network as the previous ones in absolute numbers. On the other hand, we can put it in the way that when each white node has, in average, two black nodes in its transmission range, there is still 90% of keys secure. Let us again analyse a bit the depicted results.
There is an interval of network densities where the number of secure keys is decreasing with density. It is rather interesting that it is only a short interval and when the network density goes above a certain level, the link keys' security starts decreasing with density. It can be best seen in the graph of pull protocol with basic whispering. We are not sure about the reasons yet, but it is a property that can be used to determine optimum density of the network from the security point of view and reduce cost of node redeployment by limiting number of newly deployed white keys to reach best possible security.
First three runs of amplification protocols bring substantial improvements. The graphs show five runs of amplification protocols and the last two produce very little improvements. This is again an interesting result potentially limiting number of messages necessary to obtain maximum security of the pairwise keys. It means that 3.n transmissions of random numbers for amplification (where n is the network density) by each node is all needed.
We believe that these results are still very good for the whispering and amplification protocols. About 7% of compromised keys in a network where 2-3 black nodes are in reach of any white node (lower right graph for density 15) is still a very surprising result. Especially when we start reason back in terms of our attacker model when only fraction of the deployment area can be eavesdropped by the adversary.
We selected the last set of graphs as it announces another interesting fact we have found -uneven distribution of compromised nodes. The graphs show numbers of black nodes that were able to compromise a certain number of link keys. The results were obtained from networks of 100.000 white nodes with 1% of black nodes. There are six protocols we have been studying and the graphs depict success rates of black nodes.
The first graph covers situation when keys are sent in clear with maximum transmission power. You can see that success rate is according to Poisson distribution. However, the number of compromised link keys is spread rather evenly. Basic whispering shifts the mean value very strongly towards low number of compromised link keys per black node.
However, the mutual whispering is a real killer and the peak is positioned in nought. It means that number of black nodes not able to compromise a single key is relatively high. Also the number of really successful black nodes, nodes able to compromise large number of keys, is rapidly decreasing with the success rate. When we take a look at the last graph -amplification protocol (push and pull have the same results) combined with mutual whispering, the number of black nodes not able to eavesdrop a single key is about 300 out of 1000 black nodes.
The implication for security of "white" link keys is that effective number of black nodes is much lower than the number of black nodes deployed. The uneven distribution also indicates that there might be large areas in the white network without compromised link keys.
Some answers
The initial goal of the work was to verify experimental results by Anderson, Chan, and Perrig and this was done. We believe that our results correspond to earlier results and confirm very good resistance of amplification protocols against local adversary. The setups we were using assumed that all black nodes deployed in the network are able to communicate and share their knowledge. It means that the nodes would have to use much more power for mutual communication than the white nodes in the network.
Our results are also much wider. We have found some surprising thresholds in the network density, number of black nodes, and number of amplification runs that can be used to adjust security properties of the network by changing or setting density of the network and still limit amount of communication. We believe that this alone is a very interesting result. We have also found a setting not identified before that is very efficient (from the communication point of view) and still ensuring very good security of link keys.
In the beginning, we just wanted to verify some of the results already presented. However, the results started to be more and more interesting as we dived deeper into the properties of the protocols. Our view is that the presented results are just preliminary and there are many more interesting issues to be discovered. Currently, we are formalising our experimental results into mathematical equations to allow easy use of the results for "security tuning" of sensor networks.
